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THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR IN A FAIR TRIAL
FREDERICK J. LUDWIG*
About forty years ago, a Georgia jury reached its verdict in one
of the most celebrated cases of the century Concededly, 13 year old
Mary Phagan had eaten her meal of bread and cabbage, and then
taken an Atlanta trolley to the National Lead Pencil Company
factory just before noon on April 26, 1913. Concededly, she had
gone for her pay envelope and its meagre contents, 10 cents an
hour for each 12 hour day of that week's drudgery Concededly,
Mary had been strangled to death there, her undergarment torn
and bloodied, and her body thrown in a pile of rubbish. The dis-
puted issue of fact was whether the defendant on trial, factory
superintendent Leo Frank, had been Mary's killer.
A fair reading of the transcript of the month-long trial dis-
closes credible evidence sufficient to support the conviction of Leo
Frank. It also discloses credible evidence supporting a reasonable
doubt of his guilt. Two judges respectively on the Supreme Courts
of Georgia' and of the United States2 had such doubts. The trial
judge, in a letter written on his deathbed to the governor urging
clemency, expressed doubt. One of three prison commissioners
voted for clemency because of his doubt. The courageous state chief
executive commuted Frank's sentence to life imprisonment. "I can
endure misconstruction, abuse and condemnation," he wrote, "but
I cannot stand the constant companionship of an accusing con-
[s]cience which would remind me that I, as governor of Georgia,
failed to do what I thought to be right."3
Whatever the doubt on the issue of Frank's guilt, there is no
question about the atmosphere of hostility and prejudice that per-
vaded the trial of that issue and the ultimate disposition of the case.
Not for a moment was the jury permitted to escape this atmos-
phere. An Atlanta newspaper reported an informal poll on Frank's
guilt-four for conviction to one for acquittal. Despite defense
motions to clear the courtroom, spectators frequently applauded
statements of the prosecutor and rulings of the trial judge adverse
to Frank. Larger crowds, unable to enter, loudly cheered the
prosecutor within earshot of the jury as he passed in and out of
*Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author has
occasionally reproduced, in substance, a paragraph from his articles, Journal-
isnm and Justice in Criminal Law, 28 St. John's L. Rev. 197 (1954), Book
Review, 6 J. Legal Ed. 129 (1953).
1. Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243, 284, 80 S.E. 1016, 1034 (1914).
2. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 345 (1915).
3. Busch, Guilty or Not Guilty? 70-72 (1952).
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the courtroom. The courtroom was finally cleared on the last day,
but the roar of the crowd outside was so great upon report of the
verdict of guilt that the polling of jurors ten feet away was in-
audible to the trial judge. Indeed, the trial judge found the position
of the prisoner so perilous that he prevailed upon defense counsel
to absent themselves and their client during return of the verdict and
polling of the jurors, all without the defendant's consent.
Within a month after his removal to the penitentiary, Frank ws-as
attacked by a fellow convict with a butcher knife while he slept. A
seven inch gash was cut in Frank's throat and his jugular vein was
severed. Four weeks later while Frank hovered between life and
death, an unmasked yet never identified mob entered the prison,
dragged Frank from his bed, handcuffed him, tied his ankles, and
drove lum in the rear of an automobile 150 miles to Marietta,
Georgia, the birth and burial place of Mary Phagan. There, early
on the morning of August 16, 1915, what remained of Frank's
body was hanged from a pine branch within sight of Mary Phagan's
grave. 4
THE ILLUSION OF PROGRESS
What progress toward fair trial in criminal cases has been made
in the years since that morning in Marietta? Reformers and
melionsts may list many apparent advances. Leo Frank was only
one of 69 Americans lynched in 1915, in 1955, there was but a
single such mob action in the United States. The Supreme Court
of the United States with two dissents turned down Frank's peti-
tion as unworthy of hearing because, even if its allegations were true,
they would not amount to denial of due process, within a decade
the same Court, with the same number of dissents, was to embrace
the doctrine that due process demands a trial free from mob
domination.5 Since 1915, and especially during the past 25 years, a
new set of uniform minimum standards for state criminal trials has
emerged by dint of a dynamic doctrine of due process. Indeed prior
to 1923,8 the Supreme Court refused to disturb any state criminal
convictions on constitutional grounds, except ones involving denial
of equal protection of the laws for discrimination along racial lines
in selection of jurors.- Since that time, the due process clause of
4. Busch, op. cit. sipra note 3, at 72-73.
5. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
6. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (192).
7. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904) ; Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S.
442 (1900), Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1882) ; Neal v. Delaware, 103
U.S. 370 (1880) , Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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the fourteenth amendment has been construed to require states to
provide criminal trials before juries free from intimidation8 and
judges without pecuniary interest in the outcome;9 in public;10
with the assistance of defense counsel ;" and with evidence that is
neither obtained by coerced confessions 2 nor suppressed by the
prosecution.13 Fair post-conviction remedies must be made avail-
able; 1" and the criminal conduct for which the accused is tried
must be based on standards ascertainable in advance of the act,15
and upon standards that do not infringe liberty of opinion 0 or
religion."r
Less optimistic observers question the extent of these advances.
In the first eight amendments to the Federal Constitution there are
listed 25 specific protections that comprise the bill of rights. Seven-
teen of these guarantees relate to fair criminal procedure. Yet
practically none of the 17 has been found sufficiently "fundamental"
to apply to state proceedings by force of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Without offending the Federal Con-
8. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
9. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
10. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
11. Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956),
Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954), Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3(1954), Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 134 (1951), Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773
(1949), Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
12. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S.
556 (1954), Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949), Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949)
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949), Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401
(1945), Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) , Vernon v. Alabama,
313 U.S. 547 (1941) , Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941), White v. Texas,
310 U.S. 530 (1940), Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (1940), Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
13. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
14. Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S. 104 (1951), Young v. Ragen, 337
U.S. 235 (1949).
15. Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948) , Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451 (1939).
16. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 922 (1957), Termimello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1 (1949), Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948), Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947),
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946), Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941), Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940) , Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937),
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931), Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
17 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), Tucker v. Texas, 326
U.S. 517 (1946), Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), Taylor v.
Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943), Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943), Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), Largent v. Texas, 318 U.9. 418 (1943),
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584
(1942), Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) , Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147 (1939), Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923), Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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stitution, a state may ignore the procedure of indictment by a grand
jury, even in a capital case;18 subject a defendant to be put in
jeopardy twice for the same offense;"9 require his self-mcrimna-
tan under compulsion ;20 try hur without a jury ;21 receive real
evidence against him at a "view" of the scene of the crime despite
his absence ;22 and even subject hun to unusual, if not cruel, pun-
ishment 23 True, the Supreme Court has held that the right against
unreasonable search and seizure applies to the states.2'- But m this
triumph of form over substance, the Court has also assured the
states that it will not disturb convictions based upon unlawfully
seized evidence.25 Indeed, even in federal prosecutions, the Supreme
Court has held that many of these guarantees in the bill of rights are
not absolute, but subject to waiver by a defendant under various
conditions.28
Any illusion of progress created by Supreme Court opinions
may be dispelled with dispatch by consideration of the paucity of
changes in the past forty years in the almost exclusively state-made
ground rules that govern crminal trials m the United States. For
example, in 1914 the rule excluding evidence obtained by unlaw-
ful search and seizure was adopted in the federal courts.27 In the
forty intervening years, only 11 states have changed their rule to
an exclusionary one by judicial construction,2 18 and only three by
limited legislation along these lines.29 This is so even though every
state has a constitutional provision virtually identical with that of
the Federal Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and
seizures20
18. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
19. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953), Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
20. Regan v. New York, 349 U.S. 58 (1955), Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947), Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
21. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900).
22. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
23. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
24. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
25. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
26. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (right to counsel), United
States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931) (privilege against self-incrimina-
tion) ; Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930) (trial by jury), Diaz
v. United, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (right of confrontation), Trono v. United
States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) (double jeopardy).
27. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
28. People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955). Cases cited
in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 36-37 table F (1949). Seven other states
adhere to a rule of exclusion by judicial decision. See Wolf v. Colorado,
supra at 34-36.
29. See Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 5 (Supp. 1955), N.C. Gen. Stat.,§ 15-27 (1953) ; Tex. Code Crnm. Proc. Ann. art. 727a (Supp. 1954).
30. See, e.g., Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; N.Y. Const. art I, § 12.
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The problem of fair trial involves two important interests the
balance of acquitting the innocent and protecting the civil liberties
of the accused, on one band, and the counterbalance of convicting
the guilty and preventing crime, on the other. Solution is simple if
only one interest is carefully considered and the other obliviously
ignored. Fair trial also signifies fairness to the prosecution, to the
actual victims of crime, and to the community at large who are its
potential victims. Prevention of crime has become an interest of
no inconsiderable magnitude. For the fifth straight year in the
United States the two million mark has been exceeded for the most
serious crimes (homicides, robberies, aggravated assaults, bur-
glaries, rapes and larcenies) 3' Since 1940, the increase in such
crimes (49.1 percent) has been virtually double the increase in our
population (25.4 percent) 82 For the first six months of 1956, there
was one such serious crime committed every 12.1 seconds." It
would be sad social engineering indeed to consider compromise of
the conflicting interests involved without realistically appraising
the serious extent of crime.
POWER OF THE PROSECUTOR
The characterization of the prosecutor (as a participant in a
courtroom conflict) merely as one of a pair of antagonists that form
the base of an imaginary triangle at whose apex sits the judge or
jury is a popular misconception. Barely one in ten accused of a
major crime in the United States ever reaches court for trial. A chief
prosecutor in one of our largest metropolitan areas may seldom
participate in a courtroom trial yet earn an enviable reputation for
the administration of his office.
A striking characteristic of criminal procedure, virtually un-
paralleled in other fields of law, is the vast discretion vested in the
administrator. It is almost entirely beyond control and comment
of appellate courts. At common law the complainant bad the option
of coming forward with an accusation or not. The exercise of this
option is now largely within police discretion. The examining
magistrate may discharge or hold the accused after preliminary
hearing. The grand jury may ignore both law and evidence and
refuse to find an indictment. Of course, the trial jury may acquit
in absolute disregard of evidence and instruction, and in doing so
put an end to criminal proceedings, which they could not do in
31. See 27 Uniform Crime Reports, No. 2 (1957).
32. Compare 11 Uniform Crime Reports, No. 2 (1941), with 26 Uniform
Crime Reports, No. 2 (1956).
33. 27 Uniform Crime Reports, No. 1 (1956).
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civil cases. Upon conviction, the trial judge has discretion in pre-
scribing treatment subject only to maximum legislative limitations,
with mandatory or mimnmum punishment rare indeed in modern
penal codes. Whether a convicted offender is to have his sentence
suspended, or be placed on probation, or go to jail for a short or
long period, is almost exclusively a matter within the discretion of
a single administrator. If the offender is impnsoned, parole boards
have discretion within wide limits to release lum before completion
of his sentence. Finally, there is the executive power to pardon or
commute, which rests beyond legislative control in the exclusive
discretion of a governor or president.34
The principal role in this dispensation of discretion is played
by the prosecutor.
(1) Power to initiate prosecutions. Whether or not a defendant
is to be accused is primarily in the unreviewable power of the
prosecutor. Only in cases in which prosecution may not be initiated
by information or affidavit filed by a district attorney and indict-
ment is not waived by a defendant does the power to accuse rest
with the grand jury. But the prosecutor is that body's only counsel
on the law as well as its sole supplier of facts. Only the witnesses
produced by the prosecutor are heard and these without cross-
examination or rebuttal. Though the evidence given is required to
be such as would be competent and admissible at trial, no effective
remedy is available to a defendant to assure that result. Indeed, us
conviction will not be later reversed even though the indictment
was unsupported by competent evidence.3 5 It is small wonder that
numerous surveys of the influence of the prosecutor on the grand
jury have reported that august body as the rubber stamp of the
prosecuting attorney.36 Of course, no prosecutor can investigate
and proceed with all of the cases in which he receives complaints.
He must select those in which the offense is the most flagrant and
the proof most certain. "Therein", observed the late Mr. Justice
Jackson, then Attorney General of the United States, "is the most
dangerous power of the prosecutor" that he will pick people that he
thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be prose-
cuted."3 7
34. See Ludvng, Book Review, 6 J. Legal Ed. 129, 130 (1953).
35. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
36. Bettinan, Crmiunal Justice m Cleveland 212 (1923), Illinois Crine
Survey 299 (1929); Moley, Politics and Criminal Prosecution 127, 143
(1929), Miller, In!ornuations or Indictments is Felony Cases, 8 Minn. L.
Rev. 379, 397-98 (1924), Chaplin, Reform its Crniiai Procedure, 7 Harv.
L. Rev. 189, 191 (1893).
37. Address by Attorney General Jackson, Second Annual Conference
of United States Attorneys, April 1, 1940, 24 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 18, 19 (1940).
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(2) Power to terninate prosecutions. The prosecutor also has
power to terminate a criminal proceeding, whether or not initiated
by indictment. He may nol-pros in some jurisdictions, in others
move to dismiss an indictment or information. There are varying
conditions of judicial approval necessary before the exercise of so
vast a discretion since the termination of a prosecution is not dis-
similar in effect to a verdict of acquittal after trial by jury But the
role of the judge usually amounts to little more than pro-forina
acquiescence. Of course, witnesses may die or disappear, or exculpa-
tory evidence be adduced, between the time of accusation and the
opening of trial, but the danger remains of dishonest exercise of
such discretion in response to political pressure.88
(3) Power to compromise prosecutions. The similar power to
accept bargain pleas from an accused is subject to the same use and
abuse. Only a dozen years ago, a county prosecutor in an area
embracing 483 square miles with a population of 350,000 was
found to have had only four assistants and no investigators on his
staff.39 Obviously, no prosecutor in any sizeable metropolis is
equipped with personnel sufficient to conduct the trial of every
accused person. There are other factors that must be delicately
balanced in accepting a plea of guilty to a less severely punishable
crime than the one with which the prisoner is charged congestion of
trial court calendars, burden of jury service on the community,
strength and weakness in the proof of the original charge, mitigat-
ing circumstances, such as undue harshness of punishment for the
original charge or the relatively good record of the accused, and,
finally but not least important, the prosecutor's preference for a
record of numerous convictions and few acquittals.
Perhaps the power of the prosecutor may be best portrayed in
contrast with the disadvantageous position of defense counsel. For
fact finding, whatever his own personnel, the prosecutor may ex-
pect cooperation from the police within his jurisdiction as well as
from about 170,000 others in local police organizations throughout
the United States. In some states, the police may lawfully tap tele-
phone wires,4" to say nothing of unlawful opportunities in other
jurisdictions to obtain information along these lines. Witnesses
within the state may be subpoenaed, and those found in several
38. Pound, Criminal Justice in the American City 20 et. seq. (1922)
39. State v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 182 S.W.2d 313 (1944).
40. E.g., N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12; N.Y. Code Crm. Proc. § 813-a,
People v. Stemmer, 298 N.Y. 728, 83 N.E.2d 141 (1948), aff'd per cunam
by an equally diided court, 336 U.S. 963 (1949).
[Vol. 41:602
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states may be returned under reciprocal witness statutes." Funds
are usually available to locate key witnesses no matter where they
may be, and to maintain in protective custody material witnesses,
beyond threat of tampering, pending trial. 2 If the awesome prestige
of the district attorney, or pressure applied at his suggestion by
numerous local licensing agencies cannot subdue a recalcitrant wit-
ness, cooperation is reasonably certain under the impending threat of
punishment for contumacious refusal to answer the prosecutor's
questions before a grand jury.
On the other hand, defense counsel may expect little informa-
tion beyond that supplied by the accused in preparing for trial.
Under simplified indictments, available in many states, it is suffi-
dent notice to a defendant accused of even a capital crime to state
in a single sentence:
"The grand jury of [X county], by this indict-
ment, accuse A.B. of the following crime
[murder in the first degree].
[Richard Roe,] District attorney of the county of [X]'
Of course, under such simplified system, a defendant is entitled
to a bill of particulars upon demand."1 But such bill usually need set
forth neither evidentiary matter nor all of the elements of the crime
charged.4 5 If the accused finds that the particulars furnished pro-
vide no reasonable information about the nature of the crime
charged, there is no recourse to appellate review until after trial
and conviction. 6 Moreover, in advance of-trial, the accused may not
detain prospective witnesses in protective custody, may not threaten
with punishment for refusal to answer his counsel's questions, or
even subpoena for interview. Indeed, identity of the prosecution's
witnesses can seldom be discovered by the defendant until they are
actually called to the stand at trial by the prosecutor. This is so even
though the prosecution in many jurisdictions map compel dis-
closure before trial of the identity of prospective defense witnesses
in those cases in which alibi testimony may be given 4
41. E.g., N.Y. Code Crinm. Proc. § 618-a. See 58 Am. Jur., Vitnesses§ 16 (1948).
42. E.g., N.Y. Code Crim Proc. § 618-b.
43. Id. § 295-d.
44. Id. § 295-g.
45. People v. Bloodgood, 251 App. Div. 593, 298 N.Y. Supp. 91 (1937);
People v. Rogers, 150 Misc. 753, 270 N.Y. Supp. 63 (1934).
46. E.g., N.Y. Code Cnm. Proc. § 517 See People v. Gersewitz, 294
N.Y. 163, 61 N.E2d 427 (1945), cert. disnussed inem., 326 U.S. 687 (1946).
47. E.g., N.Y. Code Cnr. Proc. § 295-1, People v. Rakiec, 289 N.Y.
306, 45 N.E2d 812 (1942).
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Suppose a key witness is outside the jurisdiction. To trace and
find him may cost a thousand dollars. If the defendant is indigent,
no legal aid society, court appointed attorney or public defender
will defray this expense. At best such assistance can provide an
impoverished prisoner only with capable counsel for the court-
room. To prepare for trial, such counsel has few of the telephonic
tools of investigation available to many prosecutors, and no access
to 141,667,385 fingerprint cards on file in the FBI Indentification
Division. The pre-trial discovery, inspection and examination of the
plaintiff's case, open to a civil defendant, is closed to the criminal
one. With such contrast in pre-trial preparation, it is not surprising
that many accused persons come to the courtroom with no more
preparation than a presumption of innocence, and leave it with
little proof presented in their behalf, or that many prosecutors may
point with pride to their preponderant percentages of convictions.
EXTRA-FORENSIC MISCONDUCT" PROSECUTION BY PRESS
In a recent, brutal and widely publicized sex murder of a little
girl, the defendant upon arrest was spirited away to the state
prosecutor's office. "The district attorney, even before defendant
completed his statement, released to the press details of the state-
ment (including defendant's admissions of sex play with his -victim
and other children on occasions prior to the killing) and also an-
noinced his belief that defendant was guilty and sane."' 8 Cqn-
temporaneously, in a celebrated espionage case, the appellate court
assumed that a federal prosecutor during the course of trial re-
leased to the press a certain sealed indictment to the prejudice of
defendants, and that "publication of the indictment was deliberately
'timed' "4 In the histonc murder of Bobby Franks, experienced
counsel for Leopold and Loeb found futile any jury trial of issues
of fact in theoface of their pre-trial in the press with a unanimous
verdict of guiI. The defendants pleaded guilty to the capital crime
and were heard only by a judge on the question of mitigating pun-
ishment because apparently nothing less than death could have been
expected from a jury even on a reasonably well-documented defense
of insanity 5o
48. People v. Stroble, 36 Cal. 2d 615, 620, 226 P.2d 330, 333-34 (1951),
aff'd, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). See Note, 39 Minn. L. Rev. 431 (1955), on free
press and fair trial.
49. United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 965 (1953).
50. Buscb, Prisoners at the Bar 178-79 (1953).
( ol. 41:602
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The overwhelming majority of criminal cases are disposed of
by pleas of guilty without trial. Most of the criminal cases that re-
quire trial are ordinary ones and are duly disposed of by lawyers,
judges and jurors in the courtroom according to rules of law. It is
the cause cilbre-the extraordinary crime of bloodshed or lust, or
even an ordinary one involving newsworthy defendants or wit-
nesses-which invokes jurisdiction of a second court for trial by
column and wavelength according to canons of journalism. Such
trial by press usually begins as soon as the crime is reported with
publication of details of its commission. It continues unabated
through arrest, preliminary hearing and indictment of some defend-
ant with disclosure of his confessions, witnesses' statements and
comments of police and prosecutor. Usually the unsealed verdict of
journalism is reached before the courtroom trial opens.
Occasionally there have been deliberate attempts to influence
jurors, judge and witnesses. In the trial of Leo Frank, one Atlanta
newspaper conducted an informal poll of public opinion on the
defendant's guilt.5 ' Similar press, publicity occurred during the
celebrated Lindbergh kidnapping case involving Bruno Haupt-
mann.52 Some newspapers have published names, addresses and
photographs of jurors, coupled with declarations of public senti-
ment about the guilt of the defendant on trial. In a few cases there
have been editorial threats to judges, ranging from demands for
their impeachment to warnings of defeat at the next election.
Slanted, one-sided, sensational reports of trials have also oc-
curred. The killing and carnal abuse of a six-year-old girl earned
defendant captions and headlines such as "werewolf," "fiend" and
"sex-mad killer." 53 There seems to be an unwritten law among
some newspapers to portray the defendant as sane and guilty before
and during his trial. Paradoxically, some of the same newspapers
often cry that the same defendant, once convicted and sentenced, is
really innocent after all.
In reporting evidence not admitted at trial, the greater the truth,
the greater is the danger to fair trial. By repeated association in
print and picture of the defendant with the crime charged, the
logical and legal presumption of innocence may disintegrate into a
psychological and emotional one of guilt. Disclosing the defendant's
prior activities and crnminal record nullifies any presumption of
good character. Publication of information, however truthful, in-
51. Busch, Guilty or Not Guilty? 32 n.8 (1953).
52. 22 A.B.A.J. 79-80 (1936).
53. See Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952).
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admissible at trial because it happens to be hearsay, incompetent,
privileged or irrelevant, irreparably deprives the defendant of the
protection of the exclusionary rules of evidence. Even if such in-
formation would have been admissible, but had not been offered at
trial by the prosecution, the defendant still irretrievably loses his
rights to sworn testimony and confrontation of the witnesses against
him, not to mention his privileges of cross-examination and rebuttal.
The more respectable press may discreetly abstain from such
practices, but it is undeniable that they overshadow almost every
celebrated criminal case. The average newspaper front page devotes
ten to twenty percent of its space, and an even higher ratio of its
headlines, to crime and scandal.54 Although only ten percent of
radio time is devoted to news, crime is highlighted more in news-
casts than in newspapers, to say nothing of the role of crime and
fantasy in dramatic radio and television programs."
In 1949, a little girl was murdered in the District of Columbia,
and within ten days another was stabbed to death in Baltimore. A
suspect was taken into custody A radio commentator in Baltimore
interrupted a program with the warning, "Stand by for a sensa-
tion !" Thereupon the arrest of the suspect was announced. It was
claimed in the broadcast that the suspect had confessed, had re-
enacted the crime, had dug up the knife used in the murder, and
had a long criminal record. The Criminal Court of Baltimore fined
the broadcaster for contempt for "not merely a clear and present
danger to the administration of justice, but an actual obstruction"
of it. The highest court of Maryland reversed,', relying on a series
of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States to the effect
that such curbing of the press by punishment for contempt infringes
the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. 57 The Supreme
Court of the United States refused to review this decision.
08
Yet the year before, a so-called "Bluebeard" was arrested for
murder in England. The London Daily Mirror described him as a
"vampire," published a photograph of one of his alleged victims
with gruesome details of the killing and stated that he had com-
mitted other murders. The editors received a three months' jail
sentence and the publishers were fined £ 10,000.59
54. Note, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 840 (1950).
55. Lazarsfeld, Radio and the Printed Page 200 et. seq. (1940)
56. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc. v. State, 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497
(1949).
57 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947), Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331 (1946) , Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
58. Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912 (1950)
59. Rex v. Bolam, 93 Sol. J. 220 (1949)
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The British--democratically devoted to liberty of opinion-
have not found this freedom diminished by punishing the press for
contemptuous publications interfering with fair trial in criminal
cases. Serious constitutional objections forestall any American
remedies along these lines. Proposed solution, discussed later,
should be directed at inproving procedures of bench and bar, rather
than punishing the press. Specifically, pious canons of bar associa-
tions on public statements about pending cases60 ought to be imple-
mented by sanctions sufficient to curb overzealous prosecutors.
FORENSIC MISCONDUCT IMPROPER COMMENT BY PROSECUTOR
The adversary system in the administration of Anglo-American
justice has posed many problems of the proper limits of zeal for the
advocate. The distinction between hard blows and foul ones dealt
by courtroom counsel was thus defined by one of Britain's Lord
Chief justices ."' the arms which he wields are to be the arms
of the warrior and not of the assassin. It is Is duty to strive to
accomplish the interest of his clients per fas, but not per nefas; it is
his duty, to the utmost of Is power, to seek to reconcile the inter-
ests he is bound to maintain, and the duty it is incumbent upon him
to discharge, with the eternal and munutable interests of truth and
justice.' "6
But fixing the bounds of forensic zeal is doubly complicated in
the case of the prosecutor. On one hand, he has a dual duty" advo-
cate to the state as party plaintiff to a controversy; but also minister
of justice with special responsibilities to the adversary party de-
fendant. On the other hand, the prosecutor may enjoy enormous
prestige in the courtroom compared with defense counsel. The
prosecutor with tle privilege of opening is the first lawyer to in-
struct the jury on the intricacies of the trial to come. The advantage
of a first impression is in most instances enhanced by the glamour
of the district attorney as champion of the people in its combat with
crime. Against the background of this halo effect, must be measured
60. See ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 20 (1955)
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litiga-
tion may interfere with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice
the due administration of justice. Generally, they are to be condemned.
If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify a statement to
the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An ex parte
reference to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records
and papers on file in the Court; but even in extreme cases it is better
to avoid any ex parte statement
61. Costigan, The Full Remarks on Advocacy of Lord Brougham and
Lord Chtef Justice Cockburn at the Dinner to A. Berryer on November 8,
1864, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 521, 523 (1931).
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the impact of the prosecutor's sarcastic question, derogatory re-
marks, inflammatory comments and derisive humor directed at
defendant and his witnesses. If first impressions may sometimes
fade, last ones are likely to linger. The prosecutor is assured that
tactical advantage with the closing argument.
Forensic misconduct of the prosecutor assumes many forms.
The threat to fair trial inherent in all such misconduct is this the
triers of fact may be induced to convict by weighing considerations
irrelevant to guilt or innocence, on one hand, or they may be
persuaded to disregard factors directly material to the determina-
tion of such issue, on the other hand. A simple illustration is direct
appeal to group prejudice, such as reference to a racial, 2 eco-
nomic,63 or other class to which the defendant belongs, and which
presumably possesses characteristics diminishing the credibility of
its members or making their conviction probable on less evidence
than would be required without such reference.0 4 Closely related,
and more commonly resorted to, is the prosecutorial appeal to that
perennial personal preference to avoid the stigma of community
condemnation by acquitting the accused, or conversely, to earn its
approbation by convicting him. Wartime appeals to patriotism for
offenses hindering the war effort"0 and the typical argument in the
case of atrocious crimes 0 involve this technique.
Less direct but often equally efficacious in distracting the jury
from its function of finding a verdict based upon admissible evi-
dence supporting guilt or reasonable doubt is the use of inadmis-
sible evidence. In a tame and pedestrian prosecution for income tax
evasion based upon a series of specific transactions with a single
business corporation, the prosecutor in his opening statement
promptly pictured defendant as a big-time gambler in a notorious
local underworld, placing bets in excess of a million and a half
dollars during a single year. After four professional gamblers
called by the prosecution gave page after page of testimony identi-
fying numerous gambling records and explaining mysterious gain-
62. State v. Hinton, 210 S.C. 480, 43 S.E.2d 360 (1947) (rev'd for mi-
proper remarks), Manning v. State, 195 Tenn. 94, 257 S.W.2d 6 (1953)
(rev'd for improper remarks). See Annot., 78 A.L.R. 1438 (1932).
63. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
237-38 (1940), People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App. 2d 650, 678, 245 P.2d 633, 650
(1952).
64. Fontanello v. United States, 19 F.2d 921 (9th Cir. 1927) (rev'd
for improper remarks) , People v. Singh, 11 Cal. App. 2d 244, 53 P.2d
403 (1936) (remarks held to be prejudical error).
65. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943), August v. United
States, 257 Fed. 388 (8th Cir. 1918).
66. Hale v. United States, 25 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1928), People v.
Lettinch, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952).
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bling codes, the prosecutor finally confessed that his gambling wit-
nesses' testimony "will have no probative value insofar as this case
is concerned." The trial judge made the usual impossible prescrip-
tion for the jury, "to treat such testimony as if it had never been
heard."67
More frequently the evidence consists of the personal opinions
of the prosecutor-neither given under oath nor subject to cross
examination and rebutta-by referring to the accused as guilty of
the crime charged. 8 or sometimes by epithets indicating guilt of
crimes not charged.69 It is not uncommon for the prosecutor to
comment upon various omissions by the accused to produce testi-
mony that he is privileged not to present, e.g., the accused's refusal
to testify, to call some privileged witness, or to produce evidence
of ins good character.70 Upon summation, the jury may be urged
to convict and err upon the side of severity because of the avail-
ability to the defendant of appeal, parole or pardon as corrective
devices.71
Whether such misconduct will result in reversal of conviction
in an appellate court depends upon a mosaic of factors" provocation
of defense counsel by use of equally objectionable language; timely
objection by defense counsel, corrective instruction by the trial
judge; the impact of the questioned comment upon the jury; and
the existence of independent errors as grolinds for reversal. But the
chances are slim that a combination of these factors will culminate
in reversal. A study of 62 Pennsylvania appeals in which error was
assigned for remarks of the prosecutor revealed but 8 reversals, or
less thlan 13 chances (12.9) in 100. Moreover, in 5 of these 8, mde-
pendent grounds sufficient to constitute reversible error existed." -
PRoPosED REMDms
Several solutions to the conflict between fair trial and miscon-
duct of the prosecutor have been suggested.
(a) Legislation definnig each category of misconduct and speci-
67 Samish v. United States, 223 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 848 (1955).
68. People v. Head, 108 Cal. App. 2d 734, 239 P.2d 506 (1952) (held not
projudicial error to admit statements), Annot., 75 A.L.R. 53 "(1931). Biqt cf.
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 15 (1955).
69. Ballard v. United States, 152 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1946), United
States v. Wexler, 79 F.2d 526 (2d Cir. 1935), Di Carlo v. United States, 6
1.20 364 (2d Cir.) (evidence held admissible), cert. dcmrd, 268 U.S. 706(1925).
70. See Note, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 946, 951-54 (1954).
71. See Note, 39 Va. L. Rev. 85, 87-95 (1953).
72. See Note, 12 Temp. L. Q. 496, 499 (1938).
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fying reversal of conviction as the consequence of engaging in it
has been proposed.73 Of course, no statutory chart could predict
with precision all possible misconduct. But it is doubtful whether
even legislative definition of even some misconduct would have the
desired effect of reducing its incidence. Consider a fairly well
limited area of misconduct, comment by the prosecutor upon the
accused's failure to testify All but two American jurisdictions have
constitutional provisions protecting the privilege against self-m-
crimination. 74 Three of the 48 states with such provisions explicitly
authorize by statute comment on failure to testify and these statutes
have been held not inconsistent with their constitutions." The re-
maining junsdictions either generally prohibit any unfavorable pre-
sumption7 6 or specifically forbid such comment.77 Yet among these
jurisdictions, it is by no means agreed that comment by the prose-
cutor on the defendant's failure to testify will result in reversal.
Some hold it "incurable" or "reversible per se", and consequently
no prejudice need be shown for reversal.7 Others agree that it is
"incurable", t.e., not subject to correction by instruction of the trial
judge, yet will affirm the conviction. Still others find such com-
ment "curable" by correction of the trial court.80
Apart from the difficulty of achieving reversal of conviction in
cases of prosecutorial misconduct, the wisdom of such reversal is
open to serious question. On appeal, the convicted defendant is
hardly concerned with the assurance of fair trial to criminal de-
fendants as a class through prevention of such misconduct. He is
concerned with setting aside his own conviction of crime. It might
be readily shown that a rule which allows reversal results in the
escape of the guilty more than it deters invasion of rights by
prosecutors."' To the prosecutor, the prompt verdict of guilt by
73. See Note, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 946, 978-79 (1954).
74. E.g., Minn. Const. art. I, § 7, N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. The two states
that do not have such provisions are Iowa and New Jersey.
75. Cal. Pen. Code Ann. § 1323 (West 1956), Ohio Rev. Code § 2945.43
(Baldwin 1953), Vt. Rev. Stat. § 2412 (1947)
76. E.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2016 (1947) , N.Y. Code Crim. Proc.
§ 393.
77 E.g., Mich. Comp. Laws § 617.64 (1948), Minn. Stat. § 611.11
(1953) , Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 710 (1948).
78. Friemel v. State, 148 Tex. Crim. 454, 188 S.W.2d 175 (1945)
People v. Wessel, 256 Mich. 72, 239 N.W 259 (1931), Simmons v. State,
139 Fla. 645, 190 So. 756 (1939), per curian.
79. People v. Shader, 326 Ill. 145, 157 N.E. 225 (1927), State v.
Zemple, 196 Minn. 159, 264 N.W 587 (1936)
80. Gable v. State, 245 Ala. 53, 15 So.2d 600 (1943), per curiaus
Greathouse v. State, 166 Ark. 206, 265 S.W 950 (1924). See Lamer v.
United States, 276 Fed. 699 (5th Cir. 1921)
81. Cf. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 136 (1954).
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the trial jury presents the press and public with irrefutable proof
that they have a faithful public servant; reversal by an appellate
court, removed by time and distance from the trial and upon
grounds often unintelligible to the local electorate, may be mild
deterrent indeed to future misconduct by the same prosecutor.
(b) Punishing the prosecutor by removal or suspension from
office, disbarment or suspension from practice, or fine or imprison-
ment in contempt has also been proposed.8 2 Thus far prosecutorial
misconduct has been sanctioned most frequently by a "ritualistic
verbal spanldng" 3 in appellate court opinions supplemented only
occasionally by reversal of conviction. The relatively few reported
proceedings for removal have been grounded upon lack and not
excess of zeal by the prosecutor.84 Disbarment for forensic miscon-
duct, an extreme penalty, has been sustained against defense counsel
in but a single reported instance.8 5 The remedy of removal or sus-
pension from office is unavailable for the misconduct of defense
counsel. Certainly, it would be grossly unfair to restrict the prose-
cutor " to a listless, vigorless, summation of fact m Chester-
fieldian politeness," under threat of such remedies, and permit
defense counsel with virtual immunity from them, " his lachry-
mal appeal for a verdict of acquittal notwithstanding the evidence
of guilt." 86
Among the negative remedies, contempt is free from the unfair-
ness of such unilateral application. Existing statutes are sufficiently
broad to cover forensic misconduct on both sides and provide a
wide and varied range of sanctions from censure through suspen-
sion and fine to imprisonment. 7 On the side of the prosecution, this
remedy should embrace not only forensic but extra-forensic mis-
conduct involving participation in trial by press, and it should
include not only prosecutors but other government officers who
engage in prohibited publication practices impairing fair trial.8
One caution that must be observed lest legitimate argument by
82. See Note, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 946, 980-81 (1954).
83. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co. 155 F.2d 631, 661-62(dissenting opinion), cert. demed, 339 U.S. 742 (19465.
84. E.g., In re Reid, 182 Cal. 88, 187 Pac. 7 (1920), Attorney Gen. v.
Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 131 N.E. 573 (1921), Chenault v. McLean, 48 Ohio
App. 284, 193 N.E. 352 (1933). In some jurisdictions removal of the prosecu-
tor is an executive and not a judicial proceeding. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1952), N.Y. Coast. art. 9 § 5.
85. In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 269, 87 A.2d 903 (1952), In re Disbarment
of Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953).
86. Ballard v. United States, 152 F.2d 941, 943-44 (9th Cir. 1945),
rezd on other grounds, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
87. See Note, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 946, 981-83 (1954).
88. Ludwig. Journalism and Jushice in Criminal Law, 28 St. John's L
Rev. 197, 213-14, 218-19 (1954).
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a prosecutor be dangerously limited is the avoidance of summary
proceedings that may turn upon personal hostility of a particular
judge toward him. Notice specifying the misconduct, assistance of
counsel and a public hearing should be provided for the advocate
cited for contempt, whether prosecutor or defense counsel.89 There
is another caution, however, with special application to the bearer
of the burden of proof, and that is the necessity of recognition of
appeal to emotion. More than cognitive processes are involved in
determining the closely balanced probabilities of an issue of fact.
Ten volumes of Wigmore set the rational limits of proof. A galaxy
of statutes and judicial decisions fix the logical limits of pleading.
But at the stage of summation, rhetorical and emotional argument
must be indulged because men are not moved by logic and reason
alone. The prosecutor at this stage with the burden of persuasion
must be permitted a berth wide enough for his broad responsibilities.
Yet solution to the problem of prosecutorial misconduct is not
susceptible to precipitate panaceas. A practical program should be
aimed at alleviation of abuses, not their annihilation. Two affirma-
tive points are proposed
(1) Improved preparation of prosecutors. A few years back this
writer surveyed the offerings of American law schools in criminal
law and procedure. Prescribed courses of from two to six hours
out of a total curriculum of 72 to 76 hours were reported with a
median course of three hours. Few schools provided any electives.
Of the sixteen collections of printed materials used at that time in
these courses, only one contained even a representative sampling of
cases from the Supreme Court of the United States reflecting the
impact of civil rights on criminal prosecutions in the past quarter
of a century Only one other gave respectful recognition to the
tremendous statutory ingredient of criminal law and procedure as
compared with courses on the civil side of the curriculum. With few
exceptions, the vast role of administrative discretion, the greater
precision of concept, the involved relationship with other social
sciences and the moral significance of criminal law went unnoticed.
Most collected materials were content to present selections of
appellate court opinions that often failed to come to grips realistical-
ly with the many problems of criminal law administration that are
not reviewable. This two-dimentional aspect of criminal law was
hardly enhanced by the background of instructors selected to give
these courses. In a catalogue of American law school teachers, few
listed any practical experience with criminal law or criminals.
89. Cf. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 275-76 (1948).
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"Raising up of a body of lawyers," Dean Pound has observed,
"who are to be advocates, prosecutors, and judges, with no thorough
training in criminal law, is nothing short of a threat to the ad-
ministration of justice. [B]oth the criminal law and the ad-
mimstration of justice in crnmal cases in the United States suffer
from a growing neglect of teaching and study of criminal law in our
law schools." 90 In no other field of law are the stakes so vast as the
indelible infamy and the loss, not merely of property, but of liberty
and life itself. Enlightened performance of the prosecutor ought to
begin with more thorough preparation in the law schools.
(2) Making the crtnzmial trial a search for truth rather than a
combat of counsel. Centuries ago, if the accused could walk blind-
folded and barefoot over nine red-hot ploughshares laid lengthwise
at equal distances without being scorched, he was entitled to
acquittal. Otherwise, as usually was the case, he was condemned as
guilty. One by one with the passing centuries, the ancient ordeals
by fire, by water and by battle, and trial by compurgation pro-
vided by professional oath helpers have been abandoned. In the
course of centuries, they have ceased to command the confidence of
the community as sound methods of resolving disputed issues of
fact. In man's relentless search for a satisfactory substitute for self-
help and vengeance, does the criminal trial of today command that
confidence?
We are advised" that a lawsuit is not, and cannot be made,
a scientific investigation for the discovery of truth. No scientist
would think of basing a conclusion upon such data so presented.
The court is not a scientific body "' We insist that it cannot be
anything less. In a criminal trial upon which life depends, or all
that makes life worthwhile, liberty and freedom from stigma of
conviction, pragmatic apologies for narrowing the search for truth
ought not to be acceptable. It should not suffice to say, "sometimes
a wrong decision quickly made is better than a right decision after
undue procrastination."92 Nor should a criminal trial be so much
a matter of stagecraft and so little a seeking of truth as to condone
such coaching of counsel as, " it is advisable not to ask the
witness a question, the answer to which the attorney does not
know.""3
90. Perkins, Cases and Materials on Crimunal Law and Procedure,
Introduction, xiii, xviii (1952).
91. Morgan, Forward to ALI Model Code of Evidence 3 (1942).
92. Ibid.
93. Mendelson, Crmial Cases 41 (Trial Practice Series, Practicing
Law Institute, 1946).
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The business of convicting the guilty and acquitting the inno-
cent is carried on by the present system with small margin of error.
Less than 1/100 of 1 per cent of 27,388 felony convictions involved
innocent persons during an eleven year period in a busy metro-
politan area. 94 While not all such errors come to light with judicial
rectification, other studies indicate the probability that they are
few.95 It is doubtful, however, what the criminal trial, as it is
sometimes conducted, contributes to this effectiveness. The prob-
ability of guilt of the accused has been screened long before trial
with police investigation prior to arrest, preliminary hearing before
a magistrate and a sifting of the evidence by a grand jury The fact
that the preponderant number of those accused of crime are con-
victed without trial on pleas of guilty probably adds nothing to the
minute margin of error in convicting the innocent.
The criminal trial must continue to convict the guilty and
acquit the innocent, but it must do so within a framework of fair-
ness to the accused. A criminal who remains at large in the com-
munity arouses alarm proportionate to the outrageousness of his
crime. An unfair criminal trial certainly arouses no less alarm.
Such a proceeding threatens the liberty of every potential defendant
in a criminal case, a class that embraces the entire community In
making a criminal trial a search for truth rather than a contest of
counsel, a delicate balance must be achieved between preventing
crime and protecting the civil liberties of the accused. The trial
judge, jurors, witnesses and defense counsel have their respective
responsibilities in achieving this balance. The major role remains
that of the prosecutor.
94. Report of the District Attorney, County of New York, 1946-48,
143 (1949).
95. See Borchard, Convicting the Innocent (1932).
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